Probability theory can be modified in essentially one way while maintaining consistency with the basic Bayesian framework. This modification results in copies of standard probability theory for real, complex or quaternion probabilities. These copies, in turn, allow one to derive quantum theory while restoring standard probability theory in the classical limit. This sequence is presented in some detail with emphasis on questions beyond basic quantum theory where new insights are needed.
Introduction
If it weren't for the weight of history, it would seem natural to take quantum mechanical phenomena as an indication that something has gone wrong with probability theory and to attempt to explain such phenomena by modifying probability theory itself, rather than by invoking quantum mechanics. It is actually easy to take this point of view because probability theory is so tightly constrained by Cox's Bayesian arguments [1] that there is only one plausible try. Trying this anyway [2, 3, 4, 5] , one finds that Cox's arguments work even without the assumption that probabilities are real and non-negative and one obtains "exotic" copies of standard probability theory where the probabilities may belong to any real associative algebra with unit. With 
Cox arguments
In the Bayesian view of probability theory, probabilities begin as real nonnegative numbers assigned to pairs (a, b) of arbitrary propositions. These numbers are meant to indicate, in some sense to be defined, how likely it is that proposition b is true given that proposition a is known. Given this setup, Cox argued [1] that if such an assignment of numbers is to be useful as a likelihood, it should satisfy a few plausible conditions. He then demonstrates (it is not a proof for reasons which will be clear below) that these conditions lead unambiguously to the standard Bayesian presentation of probability theory. The basic plan is to simply follow Cox's work while dropping the assumption that probabilities are real and non-negative.
Before beginning, there are a couple of technical points which might cause confusion. Cox [1] and Jaynes [25] discuss probability theory without any restriction on propositions. The idea is that probability theory is meant to be "the logic of science" and is meant to be treated slightly informally in the same sense that ordinary logic is treated slightly informally in mathematics. However, for definiteness, and since we will introduce several copies of probability theory, we work in a distributive lattice. The other technical point is that Cox, Jaynes and my previous papers work in a Boolean lattice as opposed to a distributive lattice. It is easier to deal with a plain distributive lattice and this makes no difference for the results in references 2-5.
Consider a distributive lattice L with "propositions" a, b, c ∈ L and with minimum element 0 ∈ L and maximal element 1 ∈ L. A P -probability is a pair (L, →) where →: L × L → P satisfies
for some function * : P × P → P and if b ∧ c = 0, that
for some function + : P × P → P . These are our Coxian assumptions. Arguments as to why this is plausible can be found in Jaynes [25] or by checking that they are true for frequencies in finite sets. The overall idea is, if (a → b) ∈ P summarizes how likely b is true if a is known, then we should be able to calculate certain other likelihoods purely within the algebra of P . Mathematically speaking, Cox's point is that the structure of L has im-plications for * and +. For example, for any a, b, c, d ∈ L, we have
and using the associativity of ∧,
Letting
for all such triples (x, y, z). Following Cox, we further assume that * is associative in general.
Similarly, suppose that we have
. We then plausibly assume that + is commutative in general.
One can easily complete this picture checking properties of L to see what is correspondingly expected in P .
Property of L
Expected property of P ∧ is associative * is associative ∨ is associative + is associative ∧ is commutative --∨ is cummutative + is commutative ∧ distributes over ∨ * distributes both ways over + ∨ distributes over ∧ --0 is the minimum P has an additive identity "0" 1 is the maximum P has a two-sided multiplicative identity "1"
Although the usual [0, 1] ⊂ R probabilities satisfy these conditions, they are only one possibility. At this stage, any ring will do, even a ring with non-commutative multiplication like the quaternions. Actually, the fact that we have to explain interference effects strongly suggests that we will need probabilities with an additive inverse. Plausibly also requiring scaling of probabilities by real numbers, we assume, at this stage, that the probabilities of interest are real associative algebras with unit. Further restrictions are to come in section 3.
Predicting frequencies
The exotic probabilities of the last section seem exotic mainly because we are immediately familiar with what, say, P (b|a) = 0.25 means in terms of an experiment. On the other hand, what is the predictive meaning of something like (a → b) = 2+3i? To answer this, it is helpful to realize that this problem already exists even in standard probability theory. There is nothing in probability theory as such that tells us that probability P (b|a) = 0.25 means 25% should be expected in the corresponding frequency. This must be deduced from additional assumptions. In the standard probability case, one considers N copies of the situation where a was known. One then observes that the probability that b is true n/N times peaks at 0.25, and for any interval containing 0.25, the probability to be outside the interval can be reduced as much as one wants by increasing N. Roughly speaking, the frequency meaning of standard probabilities is fixed by the additional assumption that "probability zero propositions never happen." It may help to notice that, as Jaynes points out [25] , standard probability theory works equally well on the interval [1, ∞] rather than [0, 1] . In this case, probability 4.0 would predict frequency 0.25 and one would be assuming that propositions with probability ∞ never happen. In the case of exotics, we cannot proceed quite as simply as in standard probability theory since, as will become clear, zero probability propositions may sometimes be true anyway. However, we can progress by assuming that L contains a special subspace for which the standard arguments will hold. Given P -probability (L, →), let X be a measure space and suppose that the free distributive lattice on X × R is a sublattice of L [26] . We'll refer to the second component of X × R as "time" and will often denote it as a subscript. For A ⊂ X, A t denotes a∈A a t . We will see below that frequency predictions follow if we assume that X has properties that one would expect of "the state of the system." In particular, we assume that for any time t, x t ∧y t = 0 for any x, y ∈ X with x = y, meaning that "the system can't be in two different states at the same time." Please note the clash of terminology with standard quantum theory where "state space" means a Hilbert space and not just a measure space.
Given a state space X, and a fixed time t, we can relate probabilities to functions from X to P . For a, b, c ∈ L, let "wave functions" Ψ a→b : X → P be defined by
for all measurable σ ⊂ X. Such functions are therefore related by
and, if b ∧ c = 0,
for any t ∈ R. In order to get real non-negative numbers from probabilities, we take P to have a square norm : P → R 0,+ satisfying p q = p q for p, q ∈ P . Given this, we will show that, under certain conditions,
is a probability in the ordinary sense. When it doesn't cause confusion, we will suppress the function name inside integrals as a notational convenience. We may, for example, write
Note that probabilities like (a → b ∧ c ∧ x t ) are typically zero and, of course, (a → x t ) isn't equal to Ψ t a (x). To derive properties of Prob t , note that
is equal to
and, rearranging and using
as desired. If we also knew that for b ∧ c = 0,
then we would have a complete standard probability theory and a frequency meaning would follow as in the standard argument. However, (14) is true if and only if
which, in a Hilbert space setting, is equivalent to requiring Ψ t a→b and Ψ t a→c to be orthogonal. Thus, we've concluded that we can predict frequencies, but only for sublattices of L for which (15) holds. This includes the sublattice X at any fixed time and the sublattice of propositions associated with a Hermitian operator in the Hilbert space case.
For example, suppose that we have an orthogonal set of functions {φ 1 , ..., φ n } in the Hilbert space L 2 (X) and suppose that L contains the sublattice B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n } where b i is the proposition "φ i is the best description of the system at time t." B is a sublattice and (15) is satisfied because < φ i , φ j > is zero for i = j and so Prob t on the sublattice B is therefore a probability theory in the ordinary sense and, for example Prob t (b j | n i=1 b i ) is the expected frequency that φ j is the best description of the system at time t assuming that one of the φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . φ n is optimal.
As another example, consider how we would describe a Stern-Gerlach experiment with quaternion probabilities and state space X = R 3 . At any time t while the particle is heading towards the magnet, X t is a sublattice of L and Prob t is a standard probability theory and predicts how often various subsets of X are occupied. At a time t ′ when the particle has gone through the magnet and either gone up or down, X t ′ is also a sublattice and Prob t ′ is also standard and predicts the results of the experiment. However, although X t ∪ X t ′ is a a sublattice of L, we cannot conclude that either Prob t or Prob t ′ are standard probabilities because interference terms may prevent (15) from being satisfied. This is why exotic probabilities aren't eliminated by Bell's inequalities (see section 8). You can also see that this implies that the Stern-Gerlach experiment is not a dynamical system. If there was a function f : X → X such that a particle at x t always arrives at f (x) t ′ , probabilities on X t ∪X t ′ would be determined by Prob t and f . In this sense the Stern-Gerlach system is realistic but not deterministic.
Thus, we have found that exotic probabilities can indeed acquire predictive power provided we introduce a "state space" within L and a square norm on P . Since the square norm property p q = p q is crucial, we conclude that probabilities must be real associative algebras with a square norm. There are, however, only are only three such algebras: the reals, the complex numbers and the quaternions [27] . This means that particles may only be spin 0 or spin 1/2. Since (15) is only prevented by "interference terms" we see that, in this sense, "standard probability theory is restored in the classical limit."
More about state spaces
As pointed out in [4] , modifying probability theory means that we are free to simply assume that if a particle arrives at a point x t ′ at a detecting screen in a two slit experiment, the particle was therefore somewhere in R 3 at any previous t ≤ t ′ . In general, we assume that
for all x ∈ X, t ≤ t ′ . This has immediate implications.
and if we also assume that probabilities are time invariant in the sense that
For those used to quantum mechanics, this may seem puzzling because, after assuming very little, we concluded that "the system is in an energy eigenstate." What if the system is, in fact in some other state? If this question occurs to you, remember that an exotic probability like (X t → A t ′ ) is only the best estimate that A t ′ is true given that X t is known. If one knows some additional facts F about the system, one should instead calculate (X t ∧ F → A t ′ ). Thus, our wave functions only represent what one knows about a system and can't be interpreted as "the state of the system" in any reasonable sense. Different observers will have different knowledge about a system and they may also describe a single system with different wave functions. This means that if an observer does not know all the relevant facts about a system, their wave functions may give incorrect predictions. Of course, this is not a failure of exotic probability theory any more than it is a failure of ordinary probability theory when the usual analysis of a die fails in the case of loaded die. In both cases, the theories are successful to the extent that relevant facts are known. From the Bayesian view, the particular result above means that if one knows only that the system was somewhere in state space at time t, then the best description of the system at any later time is one of the energy eigenfunctions.
One last assumption completes what one intuitively means by a "state space." Intuitively, if one knows the "state" x t at time t ∈ R, then any previous knowledge should be irrelevant. In this sense, it is natural to assume
for any t ≤ t ′ ≤ t ′′ , A, B ⊂ X, x ∈ X. This assumption also has immediate consequences. For A, B ⊂ X, letting subscripts indicate time ordering and using Ψ (19) and, repeating the same argument,
for any sequence of intermediate times t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n−1 . We can refer to such an expression as a "path integral." Note that this expression together with the definition of Prob means that "paths interfere if they end at the same point in X." This is the exotic probability version of the "which path" principle of quantum mechanics.
Definitions
Before continuing on to physics, let's collect the definitions so far and establish some terminology. For the rest of the paper, we assume lattices to be distributive and to have minimum and maximum elements denoted "0" and "1" respectively. By a "measure space," we always mean a measure space with a finite real non-negative measure.
for all a, b, c ∈ L and satisfying
for all a, b, c ∈ L with b ∧ c = 0.
Here are a few simple examples. Let L be the lattice {0, 1} and let (a → b) be 0 if b is the minimum and 1 if b is the maximum. This is a P -probability. Given a lattice L, let φ : L → P be some function satisfying
Let L be a totally ordered lattice and let (a → b) be 1 if a ≤ b and 0 otherwise. This is also a P -probability. Given a P -probability (L, →) and a sublattice M of L, let l be an element of L. We can then define a new P -probability (M,
Following standard probability theory, we say that propositions a, b ∈ L are independent if (a ∧ q → b) = (q → b) for all q ∈ L and this implies (q → a ∧ b) = (q → a)(q → b) as usual. We say that subsets A, B of L are independent if a and b are independent for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
Given a commutative P -probability (L, →), we can define the product of independent sublattices M and N of L. Letting (M × N, → × ) be defined by
we have a P -probability. Let X be a measure space and let F X be the free lattice on X ×R subject to
for all x, y ∈ X, x = y, t ∈ R and
for x ∈ X and times t ≤ t ′ . A P -probability (L, →) is said to "have a state space X" if F X is a sublattice of L and if
for all times t ≤ t ′ ≤ t ′′ for all subsets A, B ⊂ X and for all x ∈ X.
A simple interferometer
To exercise our ideas so far, let's analyze the interferometer shown in figure  1 in some detail. Although one is instinctively shy at first, we are free to use simple language to describe what happens as if the particle was a marble.
Working within a C-probability with state space X = R 3 , we can say that a particle hits S 1 and either goes on the P 1 branch or the P 2 branch. After hitting either mirror M 1 or M 2 , the particle is on the Q 1 or the Q 2 branch respectively. The particle will hit S 2 and will end up in either detector D 1 or in detector D 2 . Experimentally, one surprisingly finds that particles always end up in D 2 . Letting "e" informally denote the experimental arrangement, we would like to calculate (e → D 1 ) and (e → D 2 ). Since D j implies both
Using P 1 ∧ P 2 = Q 1 ∧ Q 2 = 0, we mechanically apply axioms to produce
Since P 1 is equivalent to a point in X, previous knowledge is irrelevant and we have (e ∧ P n → Q m ) = (P n → Q m ). We also clearly want to assume that the particle can't hop the rails, in other words we assume that (P n → Q m ) is zero unless n = m. This causes one of the sums to disappear giving
This result is not surprising, but the point to focus on is that the result follows rigorously from the exotic probability axioms with natural assumptions given the marble-like picture of what is happening.
To proceed further, we have to define what happens at the mirrors and the beam splitters. Naturally, in either this case or in standard quantum theory, what one means by "a mirror" and "a beam splitter" has to be put in by hand. In the ideal case, what one means by a "mirror" is that complex probabilities of particle bouncing off of it pick up a factor of i. A good experimentalist would naturally test this assumption in other measurements. Similarly, the beam splitters multiply probabilities by a factor of i when there is a "bounce." Thus, (e → P 2 ) = i * (e → P 1 ), (
, and (P 1 → Q 1 ) = (P 2 → Q 2 ) and so (e → D 1 ) = 0 as expected.
Suppose now that the interferometer is such that a device could be attached to M 1 such that it registered "hit" or "nohit" depending on whether the particle struck M 1 or not. Experimentally the results are different and about half the particles go into D 1 . In quantum theory, one says that this is due to the "which path" principle. The two paths ending in D 1 no longer interfere because "you can tell which path was taken." You can see that this result also follows mechanically with exotic probabilities. In the described situation, R 3 is evidently not a sufficient state space and one should use at least R 3 × {hit, nohit}. In this case, one can explicitly calculate that the interference is lost because two paths ending in D 1 no longer end at the same point in the state space. One can also calculate that if the device detecting whether M 1 is hit works so poorly that {hit, nohit} are independent of Q 1 and Q 2 , then the interference effect is entirely restored [2] .
Note the difference with standard quantum theory. Quantum mechanics has no problem with this interferometer in the sense that the wave equation can be solved for any desired input wave packet. Of course, no one wants to do this, especially to get such simple results. This explains the popularity of the "which path" principle even though it is not completely clear what it means or how it follows from the fundamental wave equation. This is analogous to doing probability theory knowing the diffusion equation but not knowing Kolmogorov's axioms. In exotic probabilities, on the other hand, both a rigorous version of the "which path" principle and any wave equation are consequences of the underlying exotic probability theory.
Exponential Decay
The interferometer from the last section suggests that exotics may be particularly helpful in situations where one wants answers which are independent of details of initial wave functions and potentials. As an example, let's con-sider "exponential decay." It is moderately well known that the familiar exponential decay from standard probability theory does not follow in quantum theory [29] . This is a somewhat puzzling result because the standard probability argument only relies on the seemingly natural assumption that the probability to decay within a given time interval only depends on the length of the interval. Let's keep this natural assumption, then, but apply it to exotic probabilities [2] . We suppose that in a P -probability with state space X, (A t → B t ′ ) = (A t+τ → B t ′ +τ ) for all t, t ′ , τ ∈ R. Suppose also that X contains a subset α whose complement β is a "trap" in the sense that β t implies β t ′ for any t ≤ t ′ . This means that α t ′ implies α t for any t ≤ t ′ also. With arguments similar to those in section 4, we find (α 0 → α t ) = e λt , (β 0 → β t ) = 1, (α 0 → β t ) = a (1 − e λt ), and (β 0 → α t ) = 0 for some λ ∈ P and a ∈ R. Although the exotic probabilities are simple exponentials, this isn't preserved in the predicted frequencies. The ordinary probability to remain free for time t is
and, using
where
Thus, for sufficiently small t, Prob(α t |α 0 ) should be constant. If we also know that α 0 and x t ∈ β t can be taken to be independent for sufficiently large t, then we say that the system is "forgetful." In this case, k(t) is asymptotically constant and Prob(α t |α 0 ) will be exponential for large times [30] . The examples of the last two sections show the usefulness of exotic probability theory directly as opposed to solving a PDE. This sort of reasoning is mostly missing in standard quantum theory.
Bell's inequalities
Bell's well known analysis of the spin version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment [28] is almost universally summarized as showing that local realistic theories are incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics and are therefore wrong. One might then expect that exotic probabilities would be ruled out by Bell because they are "realistic" in the state space sense. Bell's analysis, however, does not follow once we modify probability theory. To see the problem, you only have to notice that the first step in Bell's analysis assumes that P (M t ′ |e) = P (M t ′ ∧ Λ t |e) and
for initial setup e, final measurement M t ′ and assuming that the final results are determined by some "hidden variable" λ ∈ Λ at some time t during the flight from decay to detectors. As pointed out in section 3, equation 33 fails to hold in general due to "interference terms" [3] . In fact, Bell has shown exactly that if one wants local realism one must modify probability theory. Ironically, the standard summary of his results gives the opposite impression. Over the years, there have been more than twenty variations on Bell's result each with a different experimental arrangement and each concluding that local realistic theories are impossible. Bell's result and two of the more well known variations are considered in reference 3 in some detail and are shown not to eliminate exotic probabilities. There has also been an increasing tendency to refer to Bell and similar results as "non-local" effects because they cannot be explained by local correlations [3] . The point is, however, that if one has the wrong probability theory, one may also have the wrong notion of what is just a correlation. Within exotic probability theory, we expect that Bell's results are just correlations in the new probability theory. It's helpful to think of a classical experiment where one cuts a penny into a heads half and a tails half and mails one half penny to house A and the other half to house B. The results at the two houses are correlated, but nothing travels between them to insure the proper results. One therefore expects that there is nothing that one can do at house A to affect the fact that, at house B, one will find heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the time. The same holds true in the EPR experiment. The results at one end of the experiment are 50% spin up and 50% spin down independent of the magnet orientation nothing that happens on the other side can affect this.
Time evolution
Given some initial knowledge such as A t with A ⊂ X, the exotic probability to arrive at some B ⊂ X at some later time t ′′ is given by
for any time t ′ with t ≤ t ′ ≤ t ′′ . This is called the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation in the probability literature. In the complex case with state space R d , one can either follow reference 4 or Risken [31] to conclude that for small τ ∈ R and small z ∈ X, (x t → (x + z) t+τ ) is given by
where ν o , ν j and ν jk are moments of the time derivative of ω(
. This is a central-limit-theoremlike phenomena where the details of the unknown function (x t → (x + z) t+τ ) are smoothed over and only a dependence on it's lowest moments survives. Identifying z j /τ as the velocity, equation 35 is equivalent, for example, to the Schrodinger equation in
A j and ν jk = (i/m)δ jk . Similarly quaternion probabilities in R 4 results in the Dirac equation [6, 7] . These arguments need to be made into proofs, but there is also a mystery as to why only parts of the available moments seem to be used by nature. Why, for instance, must ν j be purely real in R 3 ?
Comparison with quantum theory
In standard quantum theory, the state of the system is a ray in a Hilbert space. To define such a theory one must define a Hilbert space and a complete set of mutually commuting self-adjoint operators to serve as observables. In addition, one chooses a Hamiltonian and labels the states in the Hilbert space by irreducible representations of the Hamiltonian's symmetry group. For Hamiltonians invariant under the Lorentz group, states have spin and four-momenta. Time evolution is a one parameter semigroup given by the Hamiltonian operator. If "mixed states" occur, they must be described by density matrices. Quite a bit of functional analysis must be understood to define this precisely.
In an exotic probability theory, on the other hand, the state of the system is a point in a measure space X. To define the theory, one simply chooses X and picks R, C or H. Particles are not thought of as having momentum or spin, or any other internal structure. The only thing that a particle can do is to be somewhere. This is all that is required, however, because experiments which measure things like momentum and spin are always ultimately measuring position. Wave functions have the same status as densities do in Bayesian theory. People with different knowledge about a system will, in general, use different wave functions. Those who have more knowledge can expect better predictions. Situations requiring "mixed states" in quantum theory are described by the same exotic theory without modification [2] and, similarly, there is no sensible concept of "being in a mixed state." Rather than choosing a Hamiltonian, one notes that wave functions are propagated in time by the unknown (x t → x ′ t ′ ). In typical state spaces this propagation obeys a PDE which depends only upon the lowest moments of (x t → x ′ t ′ ) and these moments are identified with the vector potential and metric tensor. The relevant moments can either be measured experimentally with test particles or computed with some external theory like Maxwell's equations. One does not assume Lorentz or gauge invariance to get these results.
Questions
Although both standard probability theory and basic quantum mechanics can be derived from exotic probability theory, this raises many questions about physics beyond basic quantum theory.
11.1 What is the best setting for exotic probability field theory?
Srinivasan has pioneered the application of exotic probabilities to quantum field theory developing the calculation of the Lamb shift in detail with a quaternionic version of canonical quantization. This yielded finite results which agree with standard QED calculations. It is clear in the Bayesian sense that electrons must emit photons simply because the vector potential remains unknown even when the electromag-netic field has been measured. Any calculation of an electron's motion must therefore be a sum over the various possible gauge equivalent vector potentials. One has no choice but to predict that the electron will have various possible motions and these will be correlated with various possible vector potentials. It is, however, unclear how this is to be done in detail, how vector potentials should be weighted, whether this agrees with Srinivasan's approach and whether this agrees with QED. Also, similar considerations apply to the second moment, i.e. to the metric tensor. Does this mean that one can calculate quantum gravitational radiation?
What about Yang-Mills theories?
Exotic probability theories are much more restrictive than quantum mechanics in the sense that the form of the vector potential and metric tensor is already determined by the choice of state space and probability. Since the choice of probability seems to be fixed by spin, one apparently only has the state space left to explain things like other gauge theories besides QED. Can Yang-Mills theories be formulated as exotic probability theories, and, if so, with what state space?
11.3 Why are only parts of the moments of (x t → x ′ t ′ ) used by nature?
In getting the standard evolution of wave functions in section 9, one makes very natural locality assumptions. However, it is also necessary to assume that the moments of (x t → x ′ t ′ ) are limited in ways which are unmotivated within the basic theory. Why is this necessary?
What is the minimal geometry of a state space?
The space in which particles move in quantum theory must at least be a manifold for momentum variables to be defined. On the other hand, exotics require only a measure space. Even in state spaces where one obtains a PDE, geometry enters the picture in a suggestively limited way. Given an unknown (x t → x ′ t ′ ), one assumes "locality" in the sense that for any open O ∋ x one can choose a time difference small enough for (x t → x ′ t ′ ) to be negligible for x ′ outside of O. Within O one also assumes that for small enough time difference, (x t → x ′ t ′ ) only depends upon x ′ − x. The path integral within O then reduces to a convolution which can be inverted with a Fourier transform. This is explained but not proved in reference 4. An alternative for the real or complex case is to follow the (still not completely precise) derivations of the Fokker-Planck equation as in Risken's book [31] . On the other hand, the assumptions above seem to be nicely captured by assuming that the ring of probability valued functions on O has a unit K t in the "Dirac sequence" sense [32] lim t→o
and
where f : O → P and "*" is the convolution product. Now the only place where one needs more than a topology on X is to define subtraction in the convolution product. This suggests expanding the allowed rings on O to include any ring with a product * compatible with pointwise addition and including a unit K t in the above sense. A sheaf of such rings on Borel space X would perhaps be a natural enlargement of the convolution setup described above. Questions would then be: can this be made precise? Are such sheaves always compatible with some (x t → x ′ t ′ )? Physically, living in such a geometry free space, one still expects to be able to define geodesics by following free particles. Does this result in a Riemannian manifold anyway? If so, what is the relationship between the sheaf and the corresponding manifold? Besides bringing up interesting mathematical questions, it is tempting to broaden and simplify the theory by reducing assumptions about the local structure of the state space.
11.5 How should multi-particle systems be formulated?
Although Srinivasan has worked in field theory directly, simple multi-particle systems have not been done with exotic probabilities. One expects that the relationship between "spin" and statistics will be related to the fact that the product of independent sublattices defined in section 5 only works if probabilities commute. This fact, however, is independent of d for state spaces R d . On the other hand, the normal understanding of the relation between spin and statistics does depend on dimension which suggests that the spin-statistics relationship may be different in exotic probability theories.
What is the meaning of the "time" parameter?
Although the time parameter in exotics seems essential once the state space axioms are introduced, this does not mean that exotics are nonrelativistic. "Time" in the complex R 4 theory, for example, can be interpreted as the proper time or path length parameter. One suspects however, that "time" is really the order in which one discovers facts about the system rather than anything more intrinsic. In this case, one might expect that automorphisms of the time parameter should result in equivalent theories with modified moments of (x t → x 11.7 Does quaternionic probability theory explain the behavior of electrons in detail?
Although Srinivasan and Sudarshan have shown that quaternionic probability leads to the Dirac equation [6] , the general behavior of a particle under quaternionic probability is not understood. For example, a detailed calculation of EPR within quaternionic probability is certainly needed.
11.8 Is there a quaternionic version of Maxwell's equations and are it's classical predictions correct?
The fact that the vector potential appears as the first moment of the time derivative of (x t → x ′ t ′ ) suggests that Maxwell's equations should describe complex or quaternionic vector potentials. Are there complex and quaternionic versions of Maxwell's equations and, if so, are it's classical predictions correct?
11.9 What is the analogue of "Bayesian inference" for exotics?
The whole area of "Bayesian Inference" in ordinary probability theory is based on the idea that one can used Bayes theorem (which is also true in exotics) to systematically improve probabilities based on "prior" knowledge. It is clear that the same thing should be possible with exotic probabilities. In the standard Bayesian case, this is often based on the maximum entropy principle. The issue, then, is how to do Bayesian inference and is there an analogue of maximum entropy?
11.10 Do exotic probabilities suggest useful arguments about quantum computers?
It is clear from the exotic probability point of view that a naive picture of quantum computers doing computations "on all paths simultaneously" must not be correct. In some sense, the particle can only do so much because it only, in fact, follows one path through the system. Can exotic probabilities also lead to quantitative results?
11.11 Can the argument concluding real, complex or quaternionic probability be sharpened?
Given an exotic probability, we have shown how one can extract probabilities and how this can only work if probabilities have a square norm. However, we have not shown that there is no other way to get standard probability theories from the exotics. Can the basic arguments presented here be sharpened?
Summary
Although the basic program outlined in the introduction has succeeded, this success also raises fundamental questions where more research is needed. We have at least formulated some of these questions.
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